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Abstract
We investigate the problem of semantic private information retrieval (semantic
PIR). In semantic PIR, a user retrieves a message out of K independent messages
stored in N replicated and non-colluding databases without revealing the identity of
the desired message to any individual database. The messages come with different
semantics, i.e., the messages are allowed to have non-uniform a priori probabilities
denoted by (pi > 0, i ∈ [K]), which are a proxy for their respective popularity of
retrieval, and arbitrary message sizes (Li, i ∈ [K]). This is a generalization of the
classical private information retrieval (PIR) problem, where messages are assumed to
have equal a priori probabilities and equal message sizes. We derive the semantic PIR
capacity for general K, N . The results show that the semantic PIR capacity depends
on the number of databases N , the number of messages K, the a priori probability
distribution of messages pi, and the message sizes Li. We present two achievable se-
mantic PIR schemes: The first one is a deterministic scheme which is based on message
asymmetry. This scheme employs non-uniform subpacketization. The second scheme is
probabilistic and is based on choosing one query set out of multiple options at random
to retrieve the required message without the need for exponential subpacketization. We
derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the semantic PIR capacity to exceed the
classical PIR capacity with equal priors and sizes. Our results show that the semantic
PIR capacity can be larger than the classical PIR capacity when longer messages have
higher popularities. However, when messages are equal-length, the non-uniform priors
cannot be exploited to improve the retrieval rate over the classical PIR capacity.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) describes an elemental privacy setting. In the classical
PIR problem, introduced in the seminal paper [1], a user needs to retrieve a message (file), out
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 17-13977 and ECCS 18-07348.
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of several messages, from multiple replicated databases, without revealing any information
about the identity of the desired message. This problem has attracted significant recent
interest in information theory where the fundamental limits of the problem based on absolute
guarantees (in contrast to computational guarantees as in [2]) have been investigated. In [3],
the notion of PIR capacity is introduced as the maximum ratio of the desired message size
to the total download size. Reference [3] has characterized the classical PIR capacity using a
greedy algorithm which is based on message and database symmetry. Using this performance
metric, further practical variants of the problem have been investigated [4–60].
In all these works, two assumptions are made: All messages have the same size1, L, and
all messages are requested uniformly by the users. These assumptions are highly idealistic
from a practical point of view. Take a streaming application for instance. The storage
database has a catalog of different movies and TV shows. These media files cannot be
assumed to have the same level of popularity, i.e., it is unlikely that all files are equally
probable to be downloaded by a user. The streaming service, in this case, has an a priori
probability distribution over all the files, for example, from box office revenues and online
rating systems. In addition, the media files cannot be assumed to be equal in size; some
movies are longer, some are shorter. Consequently, each message stored in the databases
exhibits different semantics, in the sense that each message has a different size and a different
prior probability of retrieval. With this backdrop, in this paper, we investigate how a PIR
scheme should be implemented over databases holding messages with different semantics.
In this paper, we introduce the semantic PIR problem. We extend the notion of the PIR
capacity to deal with the heterogeneity of message sizes and prior probabilities. We define
the retrieval rate to be the ratio of the expected message size to the expected download cost.
Due to the privacy constraint, the download cost needs to be the same for all messages;
thus, the expected download cost is equal to the download cost for each individual message.
Hence, the retrieval rate achieved by a given scheme is equal to the weighted average of all
individual message retrieval rates. We investigate the semantic PIR capacity as a function
of the system parameters: number of databases N , number of messages K, message priors
pi, and message lengths Li. We ask how semantic PIR capacity compares to classical PIR
capacity, and whether there is a PIR capacity gain from exploiting the message semantics.
In this paper, we characterize the exact semantic PIR capacity for arbitrary parameters.
To that end, we present two achievable schemes; the first scheme is deterministic, in the sense
that the query structure is fixed, and the second scheme is stochastic, in the sense that the
user picks a query structure randomly from a list of possible structures. For the deterministic
scheme, we present a systematic method to determine the subpacketization level for each
1With the exception of [11], which characterizes the capacity of the symmetric PIR (SPIR) problem for
heterogeneous file sizes (without considering a priori probabilities of retrieval) to be Rk =
Lk
maxi Li
(
1− 1
N
)
,
where Rk is the rate of retrieving message k. The achievable scheme follows by dividing the files into
partitions of length N − 1 and repeating the original SPIR scheme in each partition. This scheme zero-pads
shorter messages so that their lengths are equal to that of the longest message.
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message. Note that this is crucial in our semantic problem due to the heterogeneous message
sizes, unlike the majority of the literature that utilizes uniform subpacketization within
their schemes [61]. This scheme uses non-uniform subpacketization where the block size
considered in each download differs from one message to another. The query structure of
the deterministic scheme resembles the query structure of [3], in that, our scheme uses the
same k-sums idea of [3]. The second achievable scheme is comprised of several query options
that the user may use with equal probability to retrieve any message. In this scheme, the
messages are divided into several blocks depending on the number of databases. The message
is retrieved using a single set of queries, which is chosen uniformly randomly from the query
options to ensure privacy. This is similar to the scheme presented in [62] with an extension
to more than two databases (see also [63]). We provide a matching converse that takes into
account the heterogeneity of message sizes, resulting in settling the semantic PIR capacity.
The semantic PIR capacity is a function of the message sizes and the a priori probability
distribution. The expression implies that for certain message sizes and priors, the classical
PIR capacity may be exceeded by exploiting the semantics of the messages even if the zero-
padding needed in classical PIR to equalize the message sizes is ignored. Concretely, our
results imply: 1) When message lengths are the same, semantic PIR capacity is equal to
the classical PIR capacity no matter what the message priors are, i.e., priors cannot be
exploited to increase the PIR capacity if the message lengths are the same. 2) For certain
cases, such as when the prior probability distribution favors longer files (i.e., longer files are
more popular), the semantic PIR capacity exceeds the classical PIR capacity which depends
only on the number of databases and the number of messages. Note that, by classical PIR
capacity, we mean the classical PIR capacity expression, which may not be attainable for
heterogeneous file sizes. 3) For all priors and lengths, our scheme achieves a larger PIR rate
than the PIR rate the classical approach would achieve by simply zero-padding the messages
to bring them to the same length, as it assumes.
2 Problem Formulation
We consider a setting, where N non-colluding databases store K independent messages
(files), W1, . . . ,WK , in a replicated fashion. The messages exhibit different semantics, i.e.,
the messages have different sizes and different a priori probabilities of retrieval. The a priori
probability ofWi is denoted by
2 pi, such that pi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , K. The a priori probability
distribution is globally known at the databases and the user. We assume that all message
symbols are picked from a finite field3 Fs. The message size of the ith message is denoted
by Li. Without loss of generality, we assume that the messages are ordered with respect
2We assume that pi > 0 for all i ∈ [K] without loss of generality, as pj = 0 for some j implies that this
message, Wj , is either non-existent or never requested by the user. Hence, the setting can be reduced to a
semantic PIR problem with K − 1 messages, each with pi > 0.
3In this work, it suffices to work with the binary field, hence, symbols can be interpreted as bits.
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to their sizes4, such that L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK . Since the messages stored in databases are
independent of each other, the mutual information between them is zero,
I(Wi;Wj) =0, i 6= j (1)
The message sizes can be expressed in s-ary symbols as,
H(Wi) = Li, i = 1, . . . , K (2)
H(W1, . . . ,WK) =
K∑
i=1
H(Wi) =
K∑
i=1
Li (3)
In semantic PIR, a user needs to retrieve a message Wi without revealing the index i
to any individual database. To that end, the user sends a query to each database. The
query sent to the nth database to retrieve Wi is denoted by Q
[i]
n for n = 1, . . . , N . Prior to
retrieval, the user does not have any information about the message contents. Hence, queries
sent to the databases to retrieve messages are independent of the messages, i.e., the mutual
information between messages and queries is zero,
I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Q
[i]
1 , . . . , Q
[i]
N ) = 0, i = 1, . . . , K (4)
Once the databases receive the queries, they generate answer strings to send back to the
user. Specifically, the nth database prepares an answer string A
[i]
n which is a deterministic
function of the stored messages W1, . . . ,WK and the received query Q
[i]
n . Therefore,
H(A[i]n |Q
[i]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK) = 0, i = 1, . . . , K, n = 1, . . . , N (5)
For a feasible PIR scheme, two conditions need to be satisfied, namely, the correctness
and the privacy constraints. These are formally described as follows.
Correctness: The user should be able to perfectly retrieve the desired message as soon
as the answer strings to the queries are received from the respective databases. Therefore,
H(Wi|A
[i]
1 , . . . , A
[i]
N , Q
[i]
1 , . . . , Q
[i]
N) = 0, i = 1, . . . , K (6)
Privacy: To protect the privacy of the desired message index i, the queries should not
leak any information about i. Formally, for the nth database, the a posteriori probability
of the message index i given a query Q
[i]
n should be equal to the a priori probability of the
message index i. That is, the random variable representing the desired message index, θ,
4This is for ease of expression of the capacity formula in (10). The largest length should have the largest
coefficient in the expression in (10) in order to have the largest achievable rate and the tightest converse.
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should be independent of the received set of queries. Therefore,
P (θ = i|Q[i]n ) = P (θ = i), i = 1, . . . , K, n = 1, . . . , N (7)
The privacy constraint (7) implies,
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK), n = 1, . . . , N, i, j = 1, . . . , K, i 6= j (8)
An achievable semantic PIR scheme is a scheme that satisfies the correctness constraint
(6) and the privacy constraint (7). Due to the heterogeneity of message sizes and a priori
probabilities, in this work, we define the performance metric, the expected retrieval rate R,
as the ratio of the expected retrieved message size to the expected download size, i.e.,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
(9)
where E[L] is the expected number of useful bits downloaded and E[D] is the expected num-
ber of total bits downloaded. The expectation E[·] is with respect to the a priori probability
distribution. The semantic PIR capacity is defined as the supremum of the expected retrieval
rates over all achievable PIR schemes, i.e., C = sup R.
3 Main Results and Discussions
In this section, we present the main results of the paper. Our first result is a complete
characterization of the semantic PIR capacity. The semantic PIR capacity depends on the
message sizes and prior probability distribution.
Theorem 1 The semantic PIR capacity with N databases, K messages, message sizes Li
(arranged in decreasing order as L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK), and prior probabilities pi, is
C =
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LK
E[L]
)−1
(10)
=
(
L1∑K
i=1 piLi
+
1
N
L2∑K
i=1 piLi
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LK∑K
i=1 piLi
)−1
(11)
where E[L] =
∑K
i=1 piLi.
The achievability proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section 4 and the converse proof is
presented in Section 5. Next, we have a few corollaries and remarks.
The following corollary gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the cases at which
the semantic capacity exceeds the classical PIR capacity.
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Corollary 1 (A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Semantic Capacity Gain)
The semantic PIR capacity is strictly larger than the classical PIR capacity (with uniform
priors and message sizes) if and only if,
K∑
i=1
1
N i−1
(Li − E[L]) < 0 (12)
which is further equivalent to,
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
pj
N i−1
(Li − Lj) < 0 (13)
Proof: The proof follows from comparing the semantic PIR capacity expression in (10) and
the classical PIR capacity, CPIR, in [3],
CPIR =
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)−1
(14)
Hence, C > CPIR implies
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LK
E[L]
< 1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
(15)
Ordering the terms leads to,
K∑
i=1
1
N i−1
(Li − E[L]) < 0 (16)
Noting Li =
∑K
j=1 pjLi, since pj sum to 1, and E[L] =
∑K
j=1 pjLj by definition of expectation,
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
pj
N i−1
(Li − Lj) < 0 (17)

Remark 1 The condition in (12) is a statement about the sum weighted (by 1
N i−1
) deviation
of message size from its expected value. Note that the expected value of the message size E[L]
is a function of the message sizes Li and the prior distribution pi for i = 1, . . . , K.
Remark 2 More explicit conditions can be derived for specific cases. For example, consider
the case K = 2, N = 2, and assume that L1 > L2 (strictly larger). Then, (12) simplifies to,
(L1 − (p1L1 + p2L2)) +
1
2
(L2 − (p1L1 + p2L2)) < 0 (18)
6
p2(L1 − L2) +
1
2
p1(L2 − L1) < 0 (19)
p2 −
1
2
p1 < 0 (20)
p1 >
2
3
(21)
where (20) follows from L1 > L2. This means that for N = 2 and K = 2, the capacity of
semantic PIR is greater than the capacity of classical PIR when the a priori probability of
the longer message is greater than 2
3
irrespective of the values of L1 and L2.
As a further explicit example, if the more likely message is 4 times more likely and 4
times longer than the less likely message, i.e., if p1 = 4p2 and L1 = 4L2, then the semantic
PIR capacity is C = 34
45
while the classical PIR capacity is CPIR =
2
3
= 30
45
. That is, for this
case, CPIR =
2
3
< C = 34
45
.
Remark 3 We further expand on Remark 2 above by noting the following fact. The classical
PIR capacity is a formula, as given in (14), that depends only on the number of databases
N and the number of messages K, and is not necessarily achievable by the classical PIR
scheme for any given message priors and lengths. To see this, we note that the classical
PIR scheme requires equal message sizes. In the example in Remark 2 where p1 = 4p2 and
L1 = 4L2, if we zero-pad the shorter message to make the message lengths the same, we
achieve Rach = p1
L1
D
+ p2
L2
D
= 17
30
by noting D = 3
2
L1 as the length of the longer message is
the common message length now, and the classical PIR capacity for this case is 2
3
. Thus, we
observe Rach =
17
30
< CPIR =
2
3
< C = 34
45
for this case.
As a follow up to Remark 3, we note that the achievable scheme proposed in this paper
always outperforms zero-padding shorter messages and applying the classical PIR scheme
for so-constructed equal-length messages. This is proved in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Semantic PIR capacity outperforms classical PIR rate with zero-padding.
Proof: We first calculate the general achievable rate for the classical PIR scheme with zero-
padding, Rach. Noting L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK , we zero-pad messages 2, . . . , K until the
message sizes are all equal to L1. Next, we apply the classical PIR scheme with the common
message size L1. Then, the download cost (and the expected download cost) becomes,
E[D] = D =
L1
CPIR
(22)
Now, using CPIR in (14) in equation (22) above, we obtain,
Rach =
E[L]
E[D]
=
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L1
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
L1
E[L]
)−1
(23)
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Note repeated L1 in the expression in (23). Comparing Rach in (23) with the semantic PIR
capacity in (10), we deduce that Rach ≤ C as L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK . 
Remark 4 If all messages have equal lengths, irrespective of the prior probabilities, the
capacity of semantic PIR becomes equal to that of classical PIR. Note, in this case, Li = E[L]
and the capacity expression in (10) reduces to the classical PIR capacity expression in (14).
Thus, in order to exploit variability in priors to achieve a PIR capacity higher than the
classical PIR capacity, we need variability in message lengths.
4 Achievability Proof
In this section, we present two PIR schemes that achieve the semantic PIR capacity given
in Theorem 1. For each scheme, we first formally present the scheme, then we verify its cor-
rectness and privacy, calculate its achievable rate, and give explicit examples for illustration.
4.1 Achievable Semantic PIR Scheme 1
The scheme is based on the iterative structure of the achievable scheme in [3]. In this scheme,
the user downloads k-sums from the messages for k = 1, . . . , K. The novel component in
our scheme is the calculation of the number of stages needed to be downloaded from each
message based on the message sizes.
This achievable scheme is parameterized by (K,N, {Li}
K
i=1). Based on these parameters,
the user prepares queries to retrieve the desired message privately. The basic structure of
our achievable scheme is as follows.
1. Message indexing: Order the messages in the descending order of message sizes.
That is, index 1 is assigned to the longest message and index K is assigned to the
shortest message (L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK). Calculate retrieval parameters υ1, υ2, . . . , υK
corresponding to each message such that υ1 ≥ υ2 ≥ · · · ≥ υK . The retrieval parameters
denote the number of stages that needs to be downloaded from each message. The
explicit expressions for these parameters are given in Section 4.1.1.
For the rest of this section, assume that the user wishes to download Wj .
2. Index preparation: The user permutes the indices of all messages independently,
uniformly, and privately from the databases.
3. Singletons: Download υk different bits from message Wk from the nth database,
where n = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . , K.
4. Sums of two elements (2-sums): There are two types of blocks in this step. The first
block is the sums involving bits of the desired message, Wj , and the other block is the
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sums that do not have any bits fromWj. In the first block, download (N−1)min{υi, υj}
bit-wise sums of Wi and Wj each from the N databases for all i 6= j. Each sum
comprises of an already downloaded Wi bit from another database and a new bit of
Wj. For the second block, for all possible message pairs (Wi1 ,Wi2) for i1 6= i2 6= j,
download (N − 1)min{υi1, υi2} number of bit-wise sums of Wi1 and Wi2 each from the
N databases. Each sum comprises of fresh bits from Wi1 and Wi2 .
5. Repeat step 4 for all k-sums where k = 3, 4, . . . , K. For each k-sum, download k
bit-wise sum from k messages. If one of these messages is the desired message, the
remaining (k − 1)-sum is derived from the previous (k − 1)th round from a different
database. Otherwise, download (N−1)k−1min{υi1, . . . , υik} sums from new bits of the
undesired messages.
4.1.1 Rate of Semantic PIR Scheme 1
In this PIR scheme, the total number of downloaded bits remains constant for all message
requirements of the user in order to guarantee privacy. Therefore, E[D] in (9) can be cal-
culated by counting the total number of bits in the set of queries sent to the databases by
the user to download any message. Within the set of queries, there are
∑K
i=1Nυi number of
singletons and
∑K
i=tN(N − 1)
t−1υi
(
i−1
t−1
)
number of sums of t elements. Therefore,
E[D] =
K∑
i=1
Nυi +
K∑
t=2
K∑
i=t
N(N − 1)t−1υi
(
i− 1
t− 1
)
(24)
= N
[
K∑
i=1
υi +
K∑
i=2
i∑
t=2
(N − 1)t−1υi
(
i− 1
t− 1
)]
(25)
= N
[
K∑
i=1
υi +
K∑
i=2
υi
(
i∑
t=0
(N − 1)t
(
i− 1
t
)
− 1
)]
(26)
= N
[
K∑
i=1
υi +
K∑
i=2
υi
(
N i−1 − 1
)]
(27)
=
K∑
i=1
υiN
i (28)
In order to calculate E[L], assume that the desired message isWj. There are Nυj number
of singletons of Wj in the set of queries sent to the databases to retrieve Wj. The scheme
can recover N(N − 1)t−1υj
(
j−1
t−1
)
+N(N − 1)t−1
∑K
i=j+1 υi
(
i−2
t−2
)
number of Wj bits using the
tth block of the scheme (sum of t elements) when t ≤ j, where the first term in the sum
corresponds to t-sums with the shortest message being Wj and the second term corresponds
to t-sums with the shortest message being some other message ( 6= Wj). When t > j this
scheme is able to retrieve
∑K
i=tN(N − 1)
t−1υi
(
i−2
t−2
)
number of Wj bits as there should be at
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least t − j number of messages in the sum that are shorter than Lj . Therefore, the total
number of useful bits of Wj retrieved, Uj, is given by,
Uj = Nυj +
j∑
t=2
(
N(N − 1)t−1υj
(
j − 1
t− 1
)
+
K∑
i=j+1
N(N − 1)t−1υi
(
i− 2
t− 2
))
+
K∑
t=j+1
K∑
i=t
N(N − 1)t−1υi
(
i− 2
t− 2
)
(29)
= Nυj
(
1 +
j∑
t=2
(N − 1)t−1
(
j − 1
t− 1
))
+
j∑
t=2
K∑
i=j+1
N(N − 1)t−1υi
(
i− 2
t− 2
)
+
K∑
t=j+1
K∑
i=t
N(N − 1)t−1υi
(
i− 2
t− 2
)
(30)
= Nυj
(
1 + (N − 1)
(
j − 1
1
)
+ (N − 1)2
(
j − 1
2
)
+ · · ·+ (N − 1)j−1
(
j − 1
j − 1
))
+Nυj+1
(
j∑
t=2
(N − 1)t−1
(
j − 1
t− 2
))
+Nυj+2
(
j∑
t=2
(N − 1)t−1
(
j
t− 2
))
+ . . .
+NυK
(
j∑
t=2
(N − 1)t−1
(
K − 2
t− 2
))
+Nυj+1(N − 1)
j
(
j − 1
j − 1
)
+Nυj+2
(
(N − 1)j
(
j
j − 1
)
+ (N − 1)j+1
(
j
j
))
+ · · ·+NυK
(
(N − 1)j
(
K − 2
j − 1
)
+(N − 1)j+1
(
K − 2
j
)
+ · · ·+ (N − 1)K−1
(
K − 2
K − 2
))
(31)
= Nυj(N − 1 + 1)
j−1 (32)
+Nυj+1
(
(N − 1)
(
j − 1
0
)
+ (N − 1)2
(
j − 1
1
)
+ · · ·+ (N − 1)j
(
j − 1
j − 1
))
(33)
+Nυj+2
(
(N − 1)
(
j
0
)
+ (N − 1)2
(
j
1
)
+ · · ·+ (N − 1)j+1
(
j
j
))
+ . . . (34)
+Nυk
(
(N − 1)
(
K − 2
0
)
+ (N − 1)2
(
K − 2
1
)
+ · · ·+ (N − 1)K−1
(
K − 2
K − 2
))
(35)
= N jυj +N(N − 1)(N − 1 + 1)
j−1υj+1 +N(N − 1)(N − 1 + 1)
jυj+2 + . . .
+N(N − 1)(N − 1 + 1)K−2υK (36)
= N jυj + (N − 1)
K∑
i=j+1
N i−1υi (37)
Thus, the scheme retrieves N jυj + (N − 1)
∑K
i=j+1N
i−1υi number of useful bits of the
10
required message at a time. Hence, we define subpacketization for message Wj as Uj , where
Uj = N
jυj + (N − 1)
K∑
i=j+1
N i−1υi, j = 1, . . . , K (38)
We then need the message sizes to be a common multiple of their own subpacketizations,
Lj = αUj , j = 1, . . . , K (39)
We note that α should be the same for all j in (39) to guarantee privacy.
The requirements in (38) and (39) can be written succinctly as a matrix equation,


L1
L2
L3
...
LK−1
LK


= α


N N(N − 1) N2(N − 1) . . . NK−1(N − 1)
0 N2 N2(N − 1) . . . NK−1(N − 1)
0 0 N3 . . . NK−1(N − 1)
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . NK−1(N − 1)
0 0 0 . . . NK




υ1
υ2
υ3
...
υK−1
υK


(40)
Since L1, . . . , LK are parameters (inputs) to the scheme, the internal parameters υ1, . . . , υK
can be calculated by inverting the matrix as,


υ1
υ2
υ3
...
υK−1
υK


=
1
α


1
N
−N−1
N2
−N−1
N3
. . . − N−1
N(K−1)
−N−1
NK
0 1
N2
−N−1
N3
. . . − N−1
NK−1
−N−1
NK
0 0 1
N3
. . . − (N−1)
NK−1
−N−1
NK
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1
NK−1
−N−1
NK
0 0 0 . . . 0 1
NK




L1
L2
L3
...
LK−1
LK


(41)
Here, α should be chosen to be the greatest common divisor (gcd) of the elements of the
vector resulting from multiplying the matrix and the vector on the right side of (41). This
allows the shortest subpacketization levels for all messages for increased flexibility.
The total number of bits downloaded calculated in (28) and the number of useful bits
downloaded calculated in (37) are both within one subpacketization level. This subpacketi-
zation level downloads are repeated α times to download the entire file; see also (39). Thus,
we calculate the achievable rate of this scheme as,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
(42)
=
∑K
i=1 piUi∑K
i=1N
iυi
(43)
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=
1
α
∑K
i=1 piLi∑K
i=1
1
α
N i(N−iLi −
∑K
j=i+1(N − 1)N
−jLj)
(44)
=
E[L]∑K
i=1 Li − (N − 1)
∑K
i=1
∑K
j=i+1N
−jLjN i
(45)
=
E[L]∑K
i=1 Li − (N − 1)
(∑K
j=2N
−j+1Lj +
∑K
j=3N
−j+2Lj + · · ·+N−1LK
) (46)
=
E[L]
L1 + L2 (1− (N − 1)N−1) + · · ·+ LK (1− (N − 1)(N−(K−1) + · · ·+N−1))
(47)
=
E[L]
L1 +
L2
N
+ L3
N2
+ · · ·+ LK
NK−1
(48)
=
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LK
E[L]
)−1
(49)
where (44) follows by applying (39) in the numerator and writing υi in terms of Lj using
(41) in the denominator. This concludes the derivation of the achievable rate.
Remark 5 We assume that each message has a length which is a multiple of NK to aid
smooth computation of υ1, . . . , υK. Note that this is consistent with [3].
4.1.2 Proof of Privacy
Since L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK we have υ1 ≥ υ2 ≥ · · · ≥ υK . A given database receives a set of
queries for υ1, υ2, . . . , υK numbers of bits of W1,W2, . . . ,WK , respectively, as singletons and
(N − 1)t−1min{υi1, . . . , υit} bit-wise t-sums of Wi1, . . . ,Wit , for t = 2, . . . , K. According to
the query generation procedure, no bit of any message is requested from a given database
more than once as a singleton or as an element of a sum. Any given database receives the
exact same set of queries in type, irrespective of the desired message of the user. Similar
to other known PIR schemes, the user randomly selects a permutation of the indices of the
bits in the message block to be downloaded and uses these permuted indices in the set of
queries, allowing no pattern to be recognized among the bits of a given message within the
query set. The a posteriori probability of the user needing Wi given a realization of the set
of queries received by any given database is given by,
P (θ = i|Q = q) =
P (Q = q|θ = i)P (θ = i)∑K
j=1 P (Q = q|θ = j)P (θ = j)
(50)
According to the procedure of generating queries, we have P (Q = q|θ = i) = P (Q = q|θ = j)
for all i and j, as for a given database, the user sends queries to download the same number
of different bits (or elements of sums) from a given message, with a random permutation
of its indices, irrespective of the desired message. Thus, replacing P (Q = q|θ = j) in the
12
denominator of (50) with P (Q = q|θ = i) gives,
P (θ = i|Q = q) =
P (Q = q|θ = i)P (θ = i)∑K
j=1 P (Q = q|θ = i)P (θ = j)
(51)
= P (θ = i) (52)
which ensures that this scheme is private, since it implies that θ and Q are independent.
4.2 Examples of Semantic PIR Scheme 1
4.2.1 Example 1: N = 2, K = 2, L1 = 1024 bits, L2 = 256 bits
First, the message indices are independently and uniformly permuted. The first and the
second messages after permutations are denoted by bits ai and bi, respectively.
• Message indexing and calculation of υi: Messages are indexed such that the first mes-
sage is the longer one, and the second message is the shorter one. Below, we will give
query tables for downloading W1 and W2. We calculate υ1 and υ2 as,[
υ1
υ2
]
=
1
α
[
1
2
−1
4
0 1
4
][
L1
L2
]
(53)
where α =gcd{L1
2
− L2
4
, L2
4
}. By direct substitution, we get,
[
υ1
υ2
]
=
1
α
[
448
64
]
(54)
Hence, α =gcd{448, 64} = 64. Therefore, υ1 = 7 and υ2 = 1. The subpacketization
levels of W1 and W2 are U1 =
1024
64
= 16 and U2 =
256
64
= 4, respectively.
• Singletons: Download υ1 = 7 bits of W1 and υ2 = 1 bit of W2 each from the two
databases.
• Sums of twos: Download (N − 1)υ2 = 1 sum of W1 and W2 bits each from the two
databases. Note that if W1 is the desired message, the singletons of W2 are used as a
side information with new W1 bits in the sum and vice versa.
Tables 1 and 2 show the queries sent to the databases to retrieveW1 andW2, respectively.
The rate achieved by this scheme when downloading W1 is R1 =
16
18
= 8
9
, and the rate
achieved by this scheme when downloading W2 is R2 =
4
18
= 2
9
. Therefore, the average rate
R achieved by the scheme is,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
=
p1L1 + p2L2
p1D + p2D
= p1
L1
D
+ p2
L2
D
= p1R1 + p2R2 =
8
9
p1 +
2
9
p2 (55)
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Database 1 Database 2
a1, . . . , a7 a8, . . . , a14
b1 b2
a15 + b2 a16 + b1
Table 1: The query table for the retrieval of W1.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, . . . , a7 a8, . . . , a14
b1 b2
a8 + b3 a1 + b4
Table 2: The query table for the retrieval of W2.
This matches the capacity expression in Theorem 1 as,
C =
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
)−1
= (1024p1 + 256p2)
(
1024 +
256
2
)−1
=
8
9
p1 +
2
9
p2 (56)
The classic PIR capacity for this case with equal priors is,
C =
(
1 +
1
N
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
2
)−1
=
2
3
(57)
The semantic PIR capacity in (56) exceeds the classical PIR capacity in (57) when
8
9
p1 +
2
9
p2 >
2
3
(58)
which is when p1 >
2
3
. Consequently, when p1 >
2
3
, there is a strict gain from exploiting
message semantics for PIR, in this case.
Remark 6 Although it is apparent in this example that the rate of semantic PIR is lower
than the capacity of classical PIR for p1 <
2
3
, as discussed in Remark 2 and Remark 3, there
is a subtle aspect that should be addressed for a fair comparison. To see this, let us take
the case of uniform a priori distribution, i.e., p1 = p2 =
1
2
, i.e., a case where p1 <
2
3
. In
this case, the semantic PIR capacity using (56) is 5
9
. In order to properly use the classical
PIR scheme in [3], messages need to be of equal size. One way to do this is to zero-pad the
shorter message to be of length 1024 bits as well. In this case, the actual retrieval rate is
not 2
3
as the actual message size of W2 is much less. Specifically, the total download for this
scheme is D = L
R
= 1024
2/3
= 1536. The actual retrieval rate for the classical PIR problem is,
Rach =
1/2× 1024 + 1/2× 256
1536
=
5
12
<
5
9
<
6
9
(59)
Thus, the actual achievable rate Rach is
5
12
, which is less than the semantic PIR capacity 5
9
,
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which is less than the classical PIR capacity 6
9
. Thus, even though the semantic PIR capacity
is less than the classical PIR capacity, the semantic PIR capacity (which is achievable) is
larger than the classical PIR rate with zero-padding as proved in Corollary 2.
4.2.2 Example 2: N = 4, K = 3, L1 = 8192 bits, L2 = 2048 bits, L3 = 512 bits
First, the message indices are independently and uniformly permuted. The first, second, and
third messages after permutations are denoted by bits ai, bi and ci, respectively.
• Message indexing and calculation of υi: Messages are indexed such that the first mes-
sage is the longest one, and the third message is the shortest one. Below, we will give
the query table for downloading W2, i.e., the medium-length message. The bits of W2
are represented by bi. We calculate υ1, υ2 and υ3 as,
υ1υ2
υ3

 = 1
α


1
4
− 3
16
− 3
64
0 1
16
− 3
64
0 0 1
64



L1L2
L3

 (60)
where α =gcd{L1
4
− 3L2
16
− 3L3
64
, L2
16
− 3L3
64
, L3
64
}. By direct substitution, we get,

υ1υ2
υ3

 = 1
α

1640104
8

 (61)
Hence, α =gcd{1640, 104, 8} = 8. Therefore, υ1 = 205, υ2 = 13 and υ3 = 1. The
subpacketization levels of W1, W2 and W3 are U1 =
8192
8
= 1024, U2 =
2048
8
= 256 and
U3 =
512
8
= 64, respectively.
• Singletons: Download υ1 = 205 bits of W1, υ2 = 13 bits of W2 and υ3 = 1 bits of W3
each from the four databases.
• Sums of twos: Download (N − 1)υ2 = 39 sums of W1 and W2 and (N − 1)υ3 = 3 sums
of W2 and W3 bits each from the four databases. Use the downloaded singletons from
W1, W3 as side information with new W2 bits. Download (N − 1)υ3 = 3 bit-wise sums
of W1 and W3 each from the four databases using fresh bits of both messages.
• Sums of threes: Download (N − 1)2υ3 = 9 bit-wise sums involving all three mes-
sages from each database utilizing the downloaded sums of W1 and W3 from the other
databases in the previous step as side information.
Table 3 shows the queries sent to the databases to retrieve W2.
The rate achieved by this scheme when downloading W2 is R2 =
256
1092
= 64
273
, and the
rates achieved when downloading W1 and W3 are R1 =
1024
1092
= 256
273
and R3 =
64
1092
= 16
273
,
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Database 1 Database 2 Database 3 Database 4
a1, . . . , a205 a206, . . . , a410 a411, . . . , a615 a616, . . . , a820
b1, . . . , b13 b14, . . . , b26 b27, . . . , b39 b40, . . . , b52
c1 c2 c3 c4
a206 + b53 a411 + b92 a616 + b131 a1 + b170
...
...
...
...
a218 + b65 a423 + b104 a628 + b143 a13 + b182
a411 + b66 a616 + b105 a1 + b144 a206 + b183
...
...
...
...
a423 + b78 a628 + b117 a13 + b156 a218 + b195
a616 + b79 a1 + b118 a206 + b157 a411 + b196
...
...
...
...
a628 + b91 a13 + b130 a218 + b169 a423 + b208
b209 + c2 b212 + c3 b215 + c4 b218 + c1
b210 + c3 b213 + c4 b216 + c1 b219 + c2
b211 + c4 b214 + c1 b217 + c2 b220 + c3
a821 + c5 a824 + c8 a827 + c11 a830 + c14
a822 + c6 a825 + c9 a828 + c12 a831 + c15
a823 + c7 a826 + c10 a829 + c13 a832 + c16
a824 + b221 + c8 a827 + b230 + c11 a830 + b239 + c14 a821 + b248 + c5
a825 + b222 + c9 a828 + b231 + c12 a831 + b240 + c15 a822 + b249 + c6
a826 + b223 + c10 a829 + b232 + c13 a832 + b241 + c16 a823 + b250 + c7
a827 + b224 + c11 a830 + b233 + c14 a821 + b242 + c5 a824 + b251 + c8
a828 + b225 + c12 a831 + b234 + c15 a822 + b243 + c6 a825 + b252 + c9
a829 + b226 + c13 a832 + b235 + c16 a823 + b244 + c7 a826 + b253 + c10
a830 + b227 + c14 a821 + b236 + c5 a824 + b245 + c8 a827 + b254 + c11
a831 + b228 + c15 a822 + b237 + c6 a825 + b246 + c9 a828 + b255 + c12
a832 + b229 + c16 a823 + b238 + c7 a826 + b247 + c10 a829 + b256 + c13
Table 3: The query table for the retrieval of W2.
respectively. Therefore, the average rate R achieved by this scheme is,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
=
p1L1 + p2L2 + p3L3
p1D + p2D + p3D
= p1
L1
D
+ p2
L2
D
+ p3
L3
D
= p1R1 + p2R2 + p3R3 (62)
=
256
273
p1 +
64
273
p2 +
16
273
p3 (63)
This matches the capacity expression in Theorem 1 as,
C =
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+
1
N2
L3
E[L]
)−1
(64)
= (8192p1 + 2048p2 + 512p3)
(
8192 +
2048
4
+
512
42
)−1
(65)
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=
256
273
p1 +
64
273
p2 +
16
273
p3 (66)
The classical PIR capacity for this case with equal priors is,
C =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
4
+
1
42
)−1
=
16
21
(67)
The semantic PIR capacity in (66) exceeds the classical PIR capacity in (67) when
256
273
p1 +
64
273
p2 +
16
273
p3 >
16
21
(68)
which is equivalent to
p1 +
1
5
p2 >
4
5
(69)
4.3 Achievable PIR Scheme 2
The scheme is stochastic in the sense that the user has a list of different possible query
structures and the user picks one of these structures randomly. This is unlike the previous
scheme where the structure is deterministic and the randomness comes from the random
permutations of indices.
This scheme is developed for arbitrary number of databases and arbitrary message lengths
that are multiples of N−1; the deterministic scheme in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 assumed message
lengths that are multiples ofNK . The scheme can be viewed as an extension of the achievable
scheme in [62] to work with arbitrary number of databases and heterogeneous message sizes.
Our scheme shares similarities with [63]. However, our scheme differs in that it introduces
database symmetry to the scheme. The basic structure of the achievable scheme is as follows.
1. Message indexing: Index all messages such that L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK . Divide all
messages into N − 1 blocks. Let Wmi be the mth block of Wi.
For the rest of this section, assume that the user requires to download Wj.
2. Single blocks: Use N − 1 out of the N databases to download each block of Wj
and download nothing from the remaining database. Consider all N cyclic shifts of
the blocks around the databases to obtain N options for different queries that can be
used to download Wj . These N queries require the user to download Lj bits in total,
resulting in no side information.
3. Sums of two blocks/single blocks: Choose one database to download W 1i where
i 6= j and downloadWmj +W
1
i form = 1, . . . , N−1 from the remaining N−1 databases.
Create N query options in total by considering all N cyclic shifts of the blocks, around
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the databases. Repeat the procedure for W ℓi where ℓ = 2, . . . , N − 1. There are a total
of N(N − 1)
(
K−1
1
)
query options of this type.
4. Sums of three blocks/sums of two blocks: Choose one database to download
W 1i1 +W
1
i2
where i1, i2 6= j and download W
m
j +W
1
i1
+W 1i2 for m = 1, . . . , N − 1 from
the remaining N − 1 databases. Create N query options in total by considering all N
cyclic shifts of the blocks around the databases. Repeat the procedure for W ℓ1i1 +W
ℓ2
i2
where ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}. There are N(N − 1)
2
(
K−1
2
)
query options of this type.
5. Repeat step 4 up to sums of K blocks/sums of K − 1 blocks.
Once the user chooses a query to be sent to the N databases, out of the NK options,
each database might have to compute sums of messages with different lengths. All messages
except the longest in the sum are zero-padded to the left to have equal-length blocks. Then,
bit-wise sums are calculated.
Once the answers are received from the databases, the user might need to subtract
messages of different lengths to recover the required message. In this case, according to the
design of the scheme, the subtrahend will always be shorter than or equal to the length of
the minuend. Hence, the subtraction operation in this context will not be any different than
the usual operation.
Remark 7 Each query is chosen with probability 1
NK
as there are
∑K
t=0(N − 1)
t
(
K
t
)
= NK
number of query options in total. Each element of the sum corresponds to the number of
t-sums within the set of all possible queries that can be sent to a given database.
4.3.1 Rate of Semantic PIR Scheme 2
In this PIR scheme, each query option is utilized by the user with a probability of 1
NK
to
download any desired message. When analyzing all possible queries that can be sent to all
databases, we note that they have the same entries (in a shuffled way) irrespective of the
desired message. Since all query entries are equally probable to be sent to the databases, we
calculate E[D] by,
E[D] =
K∑
i=1
pi
1
NK
(
K∑
t=1
K−t+1∑
j=1
Lj(N − 1)
t−1
(
K − j
t− 1
))
N (70)
=
1
NK−1
K∑
j=1
K−j+1∑
t=1
Lj(N − 1)
t−1
(
K − j
t− 1
)
(71)
=
1
NK−1
K∑
j=1
Lj
K−j∑
t=0
(N − 1)t
(
K − j
t
)
(72)
=
1
NK−1
K∑
j=1
LjN
K−j (73)
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= L1 +
L2
N
+
L3
N2
+ · · ·+
LK
NK−1
(74)
where the second and third sums in (70) correspond to different t-sums and all possible
longest messages within the t-sum, respectively. The pi terms are ignored in (71) as the
expected number of downloads per query set does not depend on the desired message.
For a given desired message, the number of downloaded useful bits is the length of the
desired message (ignoring zero-padding, as it is ignored by the user upon receiving the answer
strings). This remains constant regardless of the query set utilized by the user. Hence,
E[L] =
K∑
i=1
piLi (75)
Thus, combining (74) and (75), the achievable rate of this scheme becomes,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
(76)
=
E[L]
L1 +
L2
N
+ L3
N2
· · ·+ LK
NK−1
(77)
=
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LK
E[L]
)−1
(78)
This concludes the derivation of the achievable rate.
4.3.2 Proof of Privacy
Irrespective of the desired message, the user sends one of the same set of queries to a
given database with probability 1
NK
. Therefore, from a given database’s perspective, the a
posteriori probability of the user needing message j, upon receiving a query q from a user
can be calculated by,
P (θ = i|Q = q) =
P (Q = q|θ = i)P (θ = i)∑K
j=1 P (Q = q|θ = j)P (θ = j)
(79)
=
1
NK
P (θ = i)∑K
j=1
1
NK
P (θ = j)
(80)
= P (θ = i) (81)
which ensures that this scheme is private, since it implies that θ and Q are independent.
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4.4 Example of Semantic PIR Scheme 2
4.4.1 Example 3: N = 4, K = 2, L1 = 3000 bits, L2 = 1800 bits
Tables 4 and 5 show the sets of queries that the user can utilize with probability 1
16
in order
to retrieve messages W1 and W2, respectively. We note that for a given database, the set of
possible queries that the user utilizes is the same regardless of the desired message. Whenever
a set of queries for the four databases is chosen with probability 1
16
, the required message is
retrieved by subtracting the smaller sum from the larger sums, guaranteeing correctness.
In the first block of Table 4, W1 is divided into 3 parts and each part is retrieved from
different 3 databases at each query option. In the second block, W 12 is used as side informa-
tion, which is requested from one database, and the three parts of W1 are retrieved from the
other three databases in terms of W i1 +W
1
2 for i = 1, 2, 3. The third and fourth blocks are
the same as block 2, with W 12 replaced by W
2
2 and W
3
2 , respectively. The same procedure is
carried out in Table 5, when the user needs to retrieve W2.
Probability Database 1 Database 2 Database 3 Database 4
1
16
W 11 W
2
1 W
3
1 φ
1
16
W 21 W
3
1 φ W
1
1
1
16
W 31 φ W
1
1 W
2
1
1
16
φ W 11 W
2
1 W
3
1
1
16
W 11 +W
1
2 W
2
1 +W
1
2 W
3
1 +W
1
2 W
1
2
1
16
W 21 +W
1
2 W
3
1 +W
1
2 W
1
2 W
1
1 +W
1
2
1
16
W 31 +W
1
2 W
1
2 W
1
1 +W
1
2 W
2
1 +W
1
2
1
16
W 12 W
1
1 +W
1
2 W
2
1 +W
1
2 W
3
1 +W
1
2
1
16
W 11 +W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2 W
3
1 +W
2
2 W
2
2
1
16
W 21 +W
2
2 W
3
1 +W
2
2 W
2
2 W
1
1 +W
2
2
1
16
W 31 +W
2
2 W
2
2 W
1
1 +W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2
1
16
W 22 W
1
1 +W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2 W
3
1 +W
2
2
1
16
W 11 +W
3
2 W
2
1 +W
3
2 W
3
1 +W
3
2 W
3
2
1
16
W 21 +W
3
2 W
3
1 +W
3
2 W
3
2 W
1
1 +W
3
2
1
16
W 31 +W
3
2 W
3
2 W
1
1 +W
3
2 W
2
1 +W
3
2
1
16
W 32 W
1
1 +W
3
2 W
2
1 +W
3
2 W
3
1 +W
3
2
Table 4: The query table for the retrieval of W1.
The rate achieved by this scheme when retrieving W1 is,
R1 =
L1
1
16
(
4L1 + 12(
L1
3
× 3 + L2
3
)
) = L11
16
(16L1 + 4L2)
=
3000
1
16
(16× 3000 + 4× 1800)
(82)
=
20
23
(83)
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Probability Database 1 Database 2 Database 3 Database 4
1
16
W 12 W
2
2 W
3
2 φ
1
16
W 22 W
3
2 φ W
1
2
1
16
W 32 φ W
1
2 W
2
2
1
16
φ W 12 W
2
2 W
3
2
1
16
W 12 +W
1
1 W
2
2 +W
1
1 W
3
2 +W
1
1 W
1
1
1
16
W 22 +W
1
1 W
3
2 +W
1
1 W
1
1 W
1
2 +W
1
1
1
16
W 32 +W
1
1 W
1
1 W
1
2 +W
1
1 W
2
2 +W
1
1
1
16
W 11 W
1
2 +W
1
1 W
2
2 +W
1
1 W
3
2 +W
1
1
1
16
W 12 +W
2
1 W
2
2 +W
2
1 W
3
2 +W
2
1 W
2
1
1
16
W 22 +W
2
1 W
3
2 +W
2
1 W
2
1 W
1
2 +W
2
1
1
16
W 32 +W
2
1 W
2
1 W
1
2 +W
2
1 W
2
2 +W
2
1
1
16
W 21 W
1
2 +W
2
1 W
2
2 +W
2
1 W
3
2 +W
2
1
1
16
W 12 +W
3
1 W
2
2 +W
3
1 W
3
2 +W
3
1 W
3
1
1
16
W 22 +W
3
1 W
3
2 +W
3
1 W
3
1 W
1
2 +W
3
1
1
16
W 32 +W
3
1 W
3
1 W
1
2 +W
3
1 W
2
2 +W
3
1
1
16
W 31 W
1
2 +W
3
1 W
2
2 +W
3
1 W
3
2 +W
3
1
Table 5: The query table for the retrieval of W2.
The rate achieved by this scheme when retrieving W2 is,
R2 =
L2
1
16
(
4L2 + 12× 4×
L1
3
) = L21
16
(16L1 + 4L2)
=
1800
1
16
(16× 3000 + 4× 1800)
(84)
=
12
23
(85)
The overall message retrieval rate for this example is,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
=
p1L1 + p2L2
p1D + p2D
= p1
L1
D
+ p2
L2
D
= p1R1 + p2R2 =
20
23
p1 +
12
23
p2 (86)
This matches the semantic PIR capacity expression in Theorem 1,
C =
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
)−1
= (3000p1 + 1800p2)
(
3000 +
1800
4
)−1
=
20
23
p1 +
12
23
p2 (87)
The classical PIR capacity for this case with equal priors is,
C =
(
1 +
1
N
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
4
)−1
=
4
5
(88)
The semantic PIR capacity in (87) exceeds the classical PIR capacity in (88) when
20
23
p1 +
12
23
p2 >
4
5
(89)
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which is when p1 >
4
5
. Consequently, when p1 >
4
5
, there is a strict gain from exploiting
message semantics for PIR, in this case.
Remark 8 We note again that the rate calculation presented here for the semantic PIR
capacity takes into consideration the zero-padding needed to be added to the shorter message
block in order to perform bit-wise message addition for any query realization. The classical
PIR capacity expression in (88) assumes that all messages are of equal size and hence the
extra zero-padding is not reflected in that expression. Hence, the actual rate of classical PIR
scheme is indeed less than the reported PIR capacity if the messages are of unequal size.
4.4.2 Example 4: N = 3, K = 3, L1 = 400 bits, L2 = 300 bits and L3 = 100 bits
Table 6 shows the query options that the user may use with probability 1
27
, to download W1.
Whenever a set of queries for the three databases is chosen with probability 1
27
, the required
message is retrieved by subtracting the smaller sum from the larger sums, guaranteeing
correctness.
The queries in the first block have zero side information, and retrieve the N−1 = 2 parts
of W1 using N − 1 different databases. The second block uses W
1
2 as side information, and
retrieve the two parts ofW1 (in terms of a sum of itself and side information) using the other
two databases. The same procedure is carried out in blocks 3, 4 and 5, with W 12 replaced by
W 22 , W
1
3 and W
2
3 . Last four blocks of Table 6 use W
i
2 +W
j
3 for j ∈ 1, 2 as side information
and use sums of three elements (W k1 +W
i
2+W
j
3 for k = 1, 2) to retrieve the two parts of W1.
The rate achieved by this scheme when retrieving W1 is,
R1 =
L1
1
27
(
3L1 + 18(
L1
2
× 2 + L2
2
) + 6(L1
2
× 2 + L3
2
)
) = L11
27
(27L1 + 9L2 + 3L3)
(90)
=
400
1
27
(27× 400 + 9× 300 + 3× 100)
=
36
46
(91)
The rate achieved by this scheme when retrieving W2 is,
R2 =
L2
1
27
(
3L2 + 18× 3×
L1
2
+ 6× (L2 +
L3
2
)
) = L21
27
(27L1 + 9L2 + 3L3)
(92)
=
300
1
27
(27× 400 + 9× 300 + 3× 100)
=
27
46
(93)
The rate achieved by this scheme when retrieving W3 is,
R3 =
L3
1
27
(
3L3 + 18× 3×
L1
2
+ 6× 3× L2
2
) = L31
27
(27L1 + 9L2 + 3L3)
(94)
=
100
1
27
(27× 400 + 9× 300 + 3× 100)
=
9
46
(95)
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Probability Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
1
27
W 11 W
2
1 φ
1
27
W 21 φ W
1
1
1
27
φ W 11 W
2
1
1
27
W 11 +W
1
2 W
2
1 +W
1
2 W
1
2
1
27
W 21 +W
1
2 W
1
2 W
1
1 +W
1
2
1
27
W 12 W
1
1 +W
1
2 W
2
1 +W
1
2
1
27
W 11 +W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2 W
2
2
1
27
W 21 +W
2
2 W
2
2 W
1
1 +W
2
2
1
27
W 22 W
1
1 +W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2
1
27
W 11 +W
1
3 W
2
1 +W
1
3 W
1
3
1
27
W 21 +W
1
3 W
1
3 W
1
1 +W
1
3
1
27
W 13 W
1
1 +W
1
3 W
2
1 +W
1
3
1
27
W 11 +W
2
3 W
2
1 +W
2
3 W
2
3
1
27
W 21 +W
2
3 W
2
3 W
1
1 +W
2
3
1
27
W 23 W
1
1 +W
2
3 W
2
1 +W
2
3
1
27
W 11 +W
1
2 +W
1
3 W
2
1 +W
1
2 +W
1
3 W
1
2 +W
1
3
1
27
W 21 +W
1
2 +W
1
3 W
1
2 +W
1
3 W
1
1 +W
1
2 +W
1
3
1
27
W 12 +W
1
3 W
1
1 +W
1
2 +W
1
3 W
2
1 +W
1
2 +W
1
3
1
27
W 11 +W
2
2 +W
1
3 W
2
1 +W
2
2 +W
1
3 W
2
2 +W
1
3
1
27
W 21 +W
2
2 +W
1
3 W
2
2 +W
1
3 W
1
1 +W
2
2 +W
1
3
1
27
W 22 +W
1
3 W
1
1 +W
2
2 +W
1
3 W
2
1 +W
2
2 +W
1
3
1
27
W 11 +W
1
2 +W
2
3 W
2
1 +W
1
2 +W
2
3 W
1
2 +W
2
3
1
27
W 21 +W
1
2 +W
2
3 W
1
2 +W
2
3 W
1
1 +W
1
2 +W
2
3
1
27
W 12 +W
2
3 W
1
1 +W
1
2 +W
2
3 W
2
1 +W
1
2 +W
2
3
1
27
W 11 +W
2
2 +W
2
3 W
2
1 +W
2
2 +W
2
3 W
2
2 +W
2
3
1
27
W 21 +W
2
2 +W
2
3 W
2
2 +W
2
3 W
1
1 +W
2
2 +W
2
3
1
27
W 22 +W
2
3 W
1
1 +W
2
2 +W
2
3 W
2
1 +W
2
2 +W
2
3
Table 6: The query table for the retrieval of W1.
The overall message retrieval rate for this example is,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
= p1
L1
D
+ p2
L2
D
+ p3
L3
D
= p1R1 + p2R2 + p3R3 =
36
46
p1 +
27
46
p2 +
9
46
p3 (96)
This matches the semantic PIR capacity expression in Theorem 1,
C =
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+
1
N2
L3
E[L]
)−1
= (400p1 + 300p2 + 100p3)
(
400 +
300
3
+
100
9
)−1
(97)
=
36
46
p1 +
27
46
p2 +
9
46
p3 (98)
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The classical PIR capacity for this case with equal priors is,
C =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
)−1
=
9
13
(99)
The semantic PIR capacity in (98) exceeds the classical PIR capacity in (99) when
36
46
p1 +
27
46
p2 +
9
46
p3 >
9
13
(100)
which is equivalent to
p1 +
2
3
p2 >
11
13
(101)
Remark 9 The second scheme presented above is an extension to more than two databases
of the path-based scheme presented in [62]. It is also similar to the scheme provided in [63],
except for the fact that the above scheme has database symmetry as opposed to the scheme
presented in [63].
5 Converse Proof
In this section, we present the converse proof for Theorem 1. We note that our converse
proof inherits most of its core ideas from the original work of [3]. The central intuition of
our proof is the fact that lengths of all the answer strings should be equal as a consequence
of the privacy constraint. That is, since the privacy constraint requires,
A[i]n ∼ A
[j]
n , n ∈ [N ], i, j ∈ [K] (102)
we have H(A
[i]
n ) = H(A
[j]
n ) for all i, j ∈ [K] for all n ∈ [N ]. The major difference of our
proof compared to [3] is the handling of the non-equal message sizes.
We begin the proof of Theorem 1 by the definition of message retrieval rate,
R =
E[L]
E[D]
(103)
We choose some permutation {i1, . . . , iK} as an arbitrary order of the messages. The de-
nominator of (103) can be expanded as follows,
E[D] =
K∑
i=1
qi(H(A
[i]
1 ) + · · ·+H(A
[i]
N)) (104)
= H(A
[i1]
1 ) + · · ·+H(A
[i1]
N ) (105)
≥ H(A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N ) (106)
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≥ H(A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N |Q
[i1]
1 , . . . , Q
[i1]
N ) (107)
= I(Wi1, . . . ,WiK ;A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N |Q
[i1]
1 , . . . , Q
[i1]
N ) (108)
= I(Wi1;A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N |Q
[i1]
1 , . . . , Q
[i1]
N )
+ I(Wi2, . . . ,WiK ;A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N |Q
[i1]
1 , . . . , Q
[i1]
N ,Wi1) (109)
= H(Wi1) + I(Wi2 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N |Q
[i1]
1 , . . . , Q
[i1]
N ,Wi1) (110)
= Li1 + I(Wi2 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i1]
1 , . . . , A
[i1]
N , Q
[i1]
1 , . . . , Q
[i1]
N |Wi1) (111)
≥ Li1 + I(Wi2, . . . ,WiK ;A
[i1]
1 , Q
[i1]
1 |Wi1) (112)
= Li1 + I(Wi2 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i1]
1 |Q
[i1]
1 ,Wi1) (113)
= Li1 +H(A
[i1]
1 |Q
[i1]
1 ,Wi1) (114)
= Li1 +H(A
[i2]
1 |Q
[i2]
1 ,Wi1) (115)
where (105) follows from the privacy constraint, (106) follows from the independence bound,
(107) follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, (108), (114) follow
from the fact that the answer strings are deterministic functions of the messages and the
queries, (110) follows from the correctness constraint and the independence of the queries
and the messages, (111), (113) follow from the independence of messages and queries, (112)
follows from the non-negativity of the mutual information function, and finally, (115) follows
from the privacy constraint.
Since (112) holds true for any pair of query, answer string, the last inequality (115) is
also true for any (Q
[i2]
n , A
[i2]
n ), hence,
E[D] ≥ Li1 +H(A
[i2]
n |Q
[i2]
n ,Wi1), n = 1, . . . , N (116)
By summing all N inequalities corresponding to (116) and repeating the previous argu-
ments for Wi2 (with conditioning on Wi1) leads to,
NE[D] ≥ NLi1 +H(A
[i2]
1 |Q
[i2]
1 ,Wi1) + · · ·+H(A
[i2]
N |Q
[i2]
N ,Wi1) (117)
≥ NLi1 +H(A
[i2]
1 , . . . , A
[i2]
N |Q
[i2]
1 , . . . , Q
[i2]
N ,Wi1) (118)
= NLi1 + I(Wi2, . . . ,WiK ;A
[i2]
1 , . . . , A
[i2]
N |Q
[i2]
1 , . . . , Q
[i2]
N ,Wi1) (119)
= NLi1 + I(Wi2;A
[i2]
1 , . . . , A
[i2]
N |Q
[i2]
1 , . . . , Q
[i2]
N ,Wi1)
+ I(Wi3 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i2]
1 , . . . , A
[i2]
N |Q
[i2]
1 , . . . , Q
[i2]
N ,Wi1 ,Wi2) (120)
= NLi1 + Li2 + I(Wi3 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i2]
1 , . . . , A
[i2]
N , Q
[i2]
1 , . . . , Q
[i2]
N |Wi1 ,Wi2) (121)
≥ NLi1 + Li2 + I(Wi3 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i2]
1 , Q
[i2]
1 |Wi1 ,Wi2) (122)
= NLi1 + Li2 + I(Wi3 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i2]
1 |Q
[i2]
1 ,Wi1,Wi2) (123)
= NLi1 + Li2 +H(A
[i2]
1 |Q
[i2]
1 ,Wi1 ,Wi2) (124)
≥ NLi1 + Li2 +H(A
[i3]
1 |Q
[i3]
1 ,Wi1 ,Wi2) (125)
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The last inequality holds for all (Q
[i2]
n , A
[i2]
n , n ∈ [N ]), hence,
NE[D] ≥ NLi1 + Li2 + I(Wi3 , . . . ,WiK ;A
[i2]
n , Q
[i2]
n |Wi1,Wi2), n = 1, . . . , N (126)
≥ NLi1 + Li2 +H(A
[i3]
n |Q
[i3]
n ,Wi1,Wi2), n = 1, . . . , N (127)
By summing the corresponding inequalities and continuing with the same procedure for
Wi3 , . . . ,WiK as we have done for Wi1 ,Wi2 , we have,
NK−1E[D] ≥ NK−1Li1 +N
K−2Li2 + · · ·+NLiK−1
+ I(WiK ;A
[iK ]
1 , · · ·+ A
[iK ]
N |Q
[iK ]
1 , . . . , Q
[iK ]
N ,Wi1, . . . ,WiK−1) (128)
and therefore, we have,
E[D] ≥ Li1 +
1
N
Li2 + · · ·+
1
NK−2
LiK−1 +
1
NK−1
LiK (129)
This gives,
E[L]
E[D]
≤
E[L]
Li1 +
1
N
Li2 + · · ·+
1
NK−2
LiK−1 +
1
NK−1
LiK
(130)
which further gives,
R ≤
(
Li1
E[L]
+
1
N
Li2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LiK
E[L]
)−1
(131)
The upper bound in (131) holds for any permutation {i1, . . . , iK}, hence, the tightest
upper bound can be obtained by minimizing over all permutations5. Consequently,
R ≤ min
{i1,...,iK}
(
Li1
E[L]
+
1
N
Li2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LiK
E[L]
)−1
(132)
Since the messages are ordered such that L1 ≥ L2 ≥ · · · ≥ LK , the minimum upper bound is
attained at {i1, . . . , iK} = {1, . . . , K} as it gives the largest number to the largest coefficient
in the lower bound on the download cost. Thus,
R ≤
(
L1
E[L]
+
1
N
L2
E[L]
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
LK
E[L]
)−1
(133)
completing the converse proof.
5Note that the order does not matter in the case of equal message lengths in [3].
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this work, we introduced the problem of semantic PIR. In this problem, the stored mes-
sages are allowed to have non-uniform popularities, which is captured via an a priori prob-
ability distribution (pi, i ∈ [K]), and heterogeneous sizes (Li, i ∈ [K]). We derived the
exact semantic PIR capacity as a function of {Li}
K
i=1 and the expected message size E[L].
The result implies that the semantic PIR capacity is equal to the classical PIR capacity if
all messages have equal sizes Li = L for all i ∈ [K]. We derived a necessary and sufficient
condition for the semantic PIR capacity to exceed the classical PIR capacity. In particular,
we showed that if the longer messages are retrieved more often, there is a strict retrieval rate
gain from exploiting the message semantics. Furthermore, we proved that for all message
sizes and priors, the semantic PIR capacity exceeds the achievable rate of classical PIR with
zero-padding, which zero-pads all messages to equalize their sizes.
To that end, we proposed two achievable schemes for achieving the semantic PIR capac-
ity. The first one has a deterministic query structure. We have proposed a systematic way
of calculating the needed subpacketization levels for the messages. The second scheme has
a stochastic query structure, where the user picks one query structure at random from an
ensemble of structures. The first scheme has the advantage of having a fixed download cost
for all messages for all query structures unlike the stochastic scheme, which has the same
expected download cost. Nevertheless, the first scheme suffers from exponential subpack-
etization levels in contrast to the linear counterpart in the stochastic scheme. Finally, we
derived a matching converse that extends the converse scheme of [3] to take into account the
heterogeneous message sizes and prior probabilities.
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